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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DONALD J. RICHARDSON, GROVEL.
COOK and WAYNE WEAVER, individually and for an on behalf
of all similarly situated shareholders of Major Oil Corporation,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
ARIZONA FUELS CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, EUGENE DALTON,
an individual, DEANNA J. DALTON,
an individual, and MAJOR OIL
CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation,

No. 15691

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This

is

a

"class

action"

brought on behalf of

shareholders of Major Oil Corporation seeking the appointment
the

of

a

receiver

recovery

Corporation

of
by

for

funds
its

Major

Oil Corporation as well

allegedly diverted

management

and

as

from Major Oil

"controlling"

share-

holders.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On January 25, 1978, the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County entered an Order styled "Order
Appointing
a Receiver and Allowance of Class Action,"
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(herein "Order")

(R-109)

by ·which Order

the District

Court:
(a)

Granted

Plaintiffs-Respondents'

(herein "Plaintiffs") Motion To Appoint Receiver
for Defendant Major Oil Corporation, pursuant to
Rule 66 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
designated such a Receiver to assume possession
of the property and to manage the operations and
business of Major Oil Corporation; and
{b)
Order

Granted Plaintiffs'

Allowing

Maintenance

Motion

For An

of Class Action,

pursuant to Rule 23(c)(l) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure,

and certified this cause as a

class action to proceed under the provisions of
Rules

23(a)

specifying

and
under

(b)

generally,

which

but

without

sub-division of Rule

23 (b) this action is to proceed; and
(c)

Allowed

prospective

members

the Plaintiffs'

putative class

themselves

the

from

binding

and

of

to exclude
preclusive

effect of any judgment entered in this action by
filing a simple notice with the Clerk of the
Court prior to March 1, 1978.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-Appellants

(herein

"Defendants")

respectfully request this Court reverse the lower court's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
- 2 Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

order and rule as a matter of law:
a)
equate

That there was an insufficient and inad-

record

before

the

lower

court

to support the

appointment of a Receiver, and
b)

That

the case at bar must proceed as a

shareholder's derivative action pursuant to Rule 23.1
of

the

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure

asserted

by

the

Plaintiffs

are

as
not

the

only

claims

individual,

but

derivative in nature and properly belong to Major Oil
Corporation.

In

the

alternative,

Defendants urge

this

Court to remand the action to the lower court for the
purpose of designating under which subsection of Rule
23(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure this action is
to proceed with instructions that members of the putative
class be precluded from excluding themselves from the
binding and preclusive effect of any judgment entered in
this action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Unfortunately,

the record is totally bereft of

any evidence from which the facts of this action can be
ascertained.

At

the

time of

the hearing

on Plaintiffs'

Motion to Appoint Receiver and Motion for Certification of
Class, the only allegations of fact before the lower court
were

contained

in Plaintiffs'

Verified Complaint

(R-2);

there were no affidavits of record, no evidence was there
presented

and

Defendants

had

yet

to

answer Plaintiffs'

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology-Act,3administered
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Complaint as a Motion to Dismiss (R-26) was pending.
only ostensible facts

appearing of

Plaintiffs,

own

by

their

Major Oil Corporation;
4 7%

of

(R-2,

the

(c)

respect

to

shares

defendants

managing officers,
shareholders,

admission,

are

of

that

shareholders

Major

Eugene

directors,

and

Arizona

Fuels

Oil

of

allegedly

~s

Dalton

are

"controlling"

"insiders" with

Corporation

sidiary Major Oil Corporation (R-2,

Corporation

Deanna

and otherwise corporate

both

(a)

(b) Arizona Fuels Corporation holds

outstanding

112);

record are:

The

and

its

sub-

3 and 4).

The Plaintiffs acknowledge an attempt to assert
causes
(R-3,
that

of

act ion

all

allege

of

some

the

of

the

of

"causes of action"

corporate

duties

owed

assets,

to

Major

Oil Corporation.

Complaint

form of mis-management,

conversion
fiduciary

belong to Major

review

A

119) •

which

set

demonstrates
forth

self-dealing,

or

Oil

other

as

officers,

Corporation

directors,

and

waste,

breaches

minority shareholders by virtue of Defendants'
positions

therein

and

of
its

respective

"controlling"

shareholders thereof.
On
Plaintiffs'

October

13,

1977,

a

hearing

Motion to Appoint Receiver

was

(R-15)

held

on

and Motion

for an Order Allowing Maintenance of Class Action (R-14).
At the conclusion of the hearing,

the lower court allowed

Plaintiffs ten days to amend their Complaint to join Major
Oil Corporation as
24,

1978,

the

a party-defendant

lower

court

entered

( R-31).
its

Order

On January
Appointing

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Receiver

and Allowance of Class Action

( R-109)

whereby a

receiver was appointed for

Major Oil Corporation and the

action was

class

23(a)

and

certified as
(b).

a

The lower

action pursuant to Rule

court did not designate under

which subsection of Rule 23(b) the action was to proceed.
By Order

dated

June

1,

1978

( R-227)

this

Court

granted

Defendants' Petition for Intermediate Appeal.
I.

THE APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER FOR MAJOR
OIL CORPORATION ARGUMENT IS UNSUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD AND CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE
OF DISCRETION THE LOWER COURT.
A.

The Only Alleged Facts Appearing of Record Herein
are Contained Exclusively in Plaintiffs' Complaint.
The lower court interfered with the Defendants'

lawful
and

exercise and

property

record,
Major
the

enjoyment

rights

and,

with

appointed a Receiver

Oil

court

on

a

woefully

inadequate

to manage the affairs of

The totality of evidence before

Corporation.

lower

of management prerogatives

the Plaintiffs'

Motion to Appoint

a

Receiver consisted of the Complaint in this action.

There

were

other

no

affidavits

of

evidence

was

Motion.

Every major

Complaint

is

record

presented

made

at

and

the

no

testimony or

hearing

on Plaintiffs'

allegation of operative fact in the

"upon

information

and

belief",

i.e.,

suspicion and speculation.
The
21,

23,

25,

allegations

26,

only upon such

28 29,

in paragraphs

14,

15,

17,

20,

31, 32, 33, 34, 44 and 46 are made

"information and belief",

and the allega-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tions

in paragraphs

36

and

prior

"information and belief"

paragraphs by reference.

41

merely

reincorporate

allegations

of

the

preceding

The Complaint is verified by a

brief affidavit of only one of the Plaintiffs, Wayne
Weaver.

This verification recites that Plaintiff Weaver

"has read the Complaint. .. {and) ... that the same is true
of his own knowledge, except as to matters stated therein
on information and belief, and as to such matters, he
believes

them to be

true."

{R-12).

Nothing is said

concerning whether or not he has any "information" to
support

his

belief.

An Amended Complaint was

filed

subsequent to the hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion to Appoint
Receiver

but made de minimis

change in the operative

facts.
B.

Plaintiffs' Complaint Totally Failed to Satisfy the
Minimum Evidentiary Requirements Necessary for the
Appointment of a Corporate Receiver.
The leading case on the evidentiary standard to

be applied to a verified complaint seeking the appointment
of a corporate receiver is State ex. rel. Fatzer vs.
Molitor,

175

Kan.

317,

263 P.2d 207

{1953).

In its

opinion the Kansas Supreme Court exhaustively reviews all
prior authorities on this issue and concludes:
"The question is whether the usages of
the Courts of equity permit the
appointment of a receiver to take
charge of a business on a petition
verified on information and belief and
on no other showing ... Counsel have
furnished us no authorities whatever
to sustain that proposition. Our
search has demonstrated that the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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universal rule is otherwise; that is,
a receiver may only be appointed on
evidence. This may be by testimony of
witnesses or by affidavits or by
a properly verified petition used as
evidence. A petition verified on
information and belief is not an
affidavit and is not evidence--Hence
it is not a showing upon which to base
the appointment of a receiver." 263 P.
2d at 212.
Not surprisingly, the holding in Molitor has
become a well established rule on the of law:
"Where the material facts upon which
the Court must rely in determining
whether the appointment of a receiver
is proper are alleged on information
and belief and are sworn to in the
same form, such an affidavit is
insufficient." 16 Fletcher,
Cyclopedia Corporations, § 7747.
" ... a petition for the appointment of
a receiver verified on information and
belief instead of in positive terms is
not admissable in evidence to sustain
an appointment, or, to the extent
that such a petition is verified on
information and belief, it cannot be
considered." 65 Am. Jur. 2d, Receivers,
§

111.

"The evidence in support of an
application for a receiver may be
furnished ... by affidavits or by a
properly verified petition used as
evidence. However, a verified
petition stating facts on information
and belief is not an affidavit and
is not evidence upon which a receiver
may be appointed." 65 Am. Jur. 2d,
Receivers, § 112.
In
this

Court,

the absence of any contrary statement from
Defendants submit that what

is clearly

the

majority rule and what may well be the "universal" rule on
this issue should control and be adopted as the governing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
- Act,
7 -administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

law for

the case at bar.

Defendants inquiry has not

yielded any cogent authority to the contrary and no Utah
authority whatsoever.
standard
woefully

set

forth

Judged by
above,

insufficient.

the widely accepted

Plaintiffs'

Complaint

is

There was simply no basis in the

record which warranted the appointment of a receiver.

c.

The Allegations of Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint
were Too Vague and General to Support the Appointment
of a Corporate Receiver.
The management of a corporation is vested in its

board of directors, §16-10-33, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended,

and

before

this

statutory

right

of manage-

ment is removed by judicial fiat, the law is clear that a
party seeking the appointment of a receiver must make a
particularized

showing

of

the

necessity

therefore.

Conclusions and mere suspicions will not suffice:
" ... the application for a receiver
for a corporation must allege facts
rather than mere legal conclusions,
and a complaint based largely upon
generalities and conclusions and upon
imformation and belief is insufficient
upon which (sic) to appoint a receiver."
16 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations,
§

7746.

"It is incumbent upon one seeking the
appointment of a receiver to allege
in his petition, bill or application,
and to prove, the grounds upon which
he seeks such relief, and such showing
must be clear, strong, and convincing.
He must allege and prove the necessity
and propriety of the appointment,
including the existence of a state of
facts showing the danger that the
property or fund in question may be
lost, removed, or materially injured.
The party applying for a receiver must
allege specific facts rather than
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
- 8 - by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

broad conclusions. Thus, fraud must
be alleged with particularity;
broad and vague allegations of fraud
will not suffice." 65 Am. Jur. 2d,
Receivers, § 112.
"Mere general charges of fraud and
mismanagement will not authorize the
appointment of a receiver at the
instance of a minority stockholder.
Furthermore, the mismanagement of the
directors of a corporation and the
danger of loss or injury to the rights
of the complainant stockholder should
be clearly proved in order to warrant
the appointment; the power should
be clearly proved in order to warrant
the appointment; the power should
never be exercised in a doubtful
case." 65 Am. Jur. 2d, Receivers,
§

113.

Defendants submit that the Plaintiffs simply
and clearly failed to make any adequate showing whatsoever
to support their Motion for Appointment of a Receiver for
Major Oil Corporation and that the lower court erred in
appointing a receiver based upon the vague and unsupported
allegations in the Complaint.
II.
CERTIFICATION OF THIS ACTION
AS A CLASS ACTION PURSUANT TO
RULE 23(c}(l} WAS SUPERFLUOUS
AND ERRONEOUS
A.

This Action Constitutes Nothing More Than a Simple
Shareholder's Derivative Suit.
It

that

this

little

should

action

more

than

be

is,
an

clear,

is

apparently

beyond cavil,

in both substance and
ordinary,

holder's derivative suit.
so

almost

reality,

garden-variety

share-

That it is at least partially

admitted even by

the Plaintiffs

(R-2,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
- Act,
9 administered
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119):

that

it

is

entirely so is,

consequently,

the major

point of contention between the parties.
The proper

resolution of

mately turns upon the crucial,

this question ulti-

if semantically confusing,

distinction between a class action of shareholders and a
shareholder's

derivative

Procedure would
appurtenant
as

the

sort

vague

Plaintiffs'
however,

no

such

Utah Rules of Civil

23 2

itself,

and

could

proceed

ambiguously

Rule
case

deference

Complaint.

both

the

of

there

be a mere gratuitous superfluity somehow

to

present

of

23. 1 ,

Rule

distinction,

Were

suit.

1

to

both

an

rules

action

such

with

exhibited

by

the
the

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

evince

and

require

a

higher

degree

of

The distinction to be observed is

analytical precision.

that between the aggregation of

the individual claims of

putative class members, in this case shareholders, and the
secondary or representative enforcement of a single set of
claims held by a separate entity,
The

preliminary

i.e.,

the corporation.

determination

of whether

an

action commenced by a shareholder states individual claims
peculiar

to himself or,

which

may

he

assert

the corporation,

only

alternately,
derivatively

if at all,

2

see

Appendix

A for

and

on

behalf of

is at once elementary and

essential to his standing before

1

corporate claims

the

the court

text

of

and to the

Rule

23.1.

see Appendix B for the text of Rule 23.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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procedural
holder

requirements

assert an

course,

of

the

individual

action.

Should a share-

cause of action,

he may,

proceed with his suit as in any other case.

should he assert a corporate cause of action,
satisfy

the

procedural

demands

of

Rule

23.1.

of
But

he must
The mere

fact that other shareholders may assert similar individual
claims in their own actions or by intervention in his
action

does

not

claims

into

corporate

commences

a

transform

class

the

shareholder's

claims.

action

So

on behalf

a
of

individual

shareholder
all

other

who

share-

holders does not thereby succeed in somehow changing what
would

otherwise

be

an

aggregation

of

individual

claims

into a corporate claim.
The fallacy of the lower court's ruling lies
in precisely this facile equation:
sentative

of

all

shareholders

is

to sue as the reprenecessarily

to

sue

as

the representative of the corporation; but the real danger
in this sophism consists
cannot

sue

as

derivatively)
shareholders

a

in the corollary error:

representative of the corporation

one
(i.e.

lest one sues as the representative of all
(i.e.

in

a

class

action).

Such

seductive

illogic ultimately ends in the conclusion that Rule 23.1
is largely, if not entirely, superfluous.
Defendants submit that a shareholders derivative
suit

is

a well-established device of equity jurisdiction

whereby ~

shareholder

may

sue derivatively

for

and

on behalf of the corporation when the corporation itself
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for-digitization
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is wrongfully prevented from or wrongfully refuses to
assert

its

Bernhard,
(1970),

rightful
396

claims.

U.S.

531,

13 Fletcher,
Moreover,

See generally:

90 S.Ct 733,

Ross vs.

24 L.Ed

Cyclopedia Corporations,

2d

729

§5939 et.

the determination of whether a share-

holder's

claims

are

individual

corporate

and derivative

is

and

personal

properly made

by

or

the

are
court

upon the basis of the allegations appearing on the face of
the Complaint.
Aside from the fact that the Plaintiffs blithely
admit that all of the claims presented in their Complaint
are corporate claims "belonging" to Major Oil Corporation
(R-2 ,18) and that they are suing derivatively for and on
behalf of that corporation, the characterization of these
claims could

hardly be otherwise,

even sans such admis-

sions, since a brief review of the Complaint reveals only
corporate claims.
connection with

The authorities are unequivocal

the proper

characterization of

in

these

claims:
"The Court will make this determination
(of whether the Complaint states a
corporate-derivative or an individual
cause of action) from the nature
of the suit as it appears from the
pleadings, and the choice may be a
difficult one. It is clear that an
action must be derivative when the
directors are charged with the waste
of corporate assets in breach of
fiduciary duty, when contracts are
attacked as ultra vires as to the
corporation, when mismanagement is
is charged, or when an outsider is
sued for an alleged wrong to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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corporation." Note, "Developments in
the Law -- Multiparty Litigation in
the Federal Courts," 71 Harv. L. Rev.
877, at 944-945 (1958) (footnotes
omitted).
"While an injury to the corporation
resulting from wrongdoing, fraud or
negligence of corporate officers
operates indirectly, as an injury
to stockholders, the injury to stockholders is secondary and the injury to
the corporation primary. A stockholder cannot, as an individual as
distinguished from a representative
of the corporation, sue directors
or other corporate officers for
mismanagement, negligence or the
like, on a cause of action which
belongs to the corporation. In
other words, the remedial rights
of minority stockholders with respect
to wrongs committed against the
corporation by the officers and
directors in the management of
corporate affairs are derivative
rights and any action taken by the
stockholders to redress such wrongs
must be for the benefit of the
corporation. He cannot sue to set
aside a contract made in fraud upon
corporate rights. A stockholder
cannot sue as an individual to
recover damages for a conspiracy
among the majority stockholders
or corporate officers to wreck the
corporation. Improper manipulation
of funds by the controlling stockholder creates a cause of action
in favor of the corporation rather
than in favor of a stockholder as
an individual, as does a wrongful
diversion of corporate assets."
13 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations,
§5924 (footnotes omitted). See
further; Lattin, Corporations, §102
( 1971).
The

causes

of

perforce corporate claims.

action

at

issue herein are

This action does not involve

an amalgam of discrete claims held by various individuals
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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bound

together,

if

tions of law or

at

all,

fact,

only

which,

by certain

common ques-

if they predominate, may

warrant their joinder into a cumbersome class action under
Rule 23(b)(3). On the contrary,

the particular plaintiffs

in this case assert no direct,

personal causes of action

!'!_ fortiori,

of their own.
class

can assert

personal

to

no

such

themselves,

representative

of

the members of their putative
individual
lest

Plaintiffs

Rather,

them.

causes of

the

cease

Plaintiffs

case have standing to assert but one

action
to
in

be

this

set of claims--the

claims of the corporation--and not a myriad of multifarious

individual

shareholders

held

by

of the corporation.

shareholders will
and,

claims

to be sure,

various

far-flung

Most assuredly,

all

benefit by a corpoate recovery herein,
any shareholder could bring this action,

assuming that he met the minimum standards of Rule 23.1.
But

to

say

that

"anyone

can

sue"

and

"everyone

will

benefit" simply does not amount to a persuasive showing of
the necessity of a class action, for it does not alter the
immutable
tion,

fact

and

whoever

corporation.
of

the

court

that whoever

and,

misconceived

needlessly.

benefits,

sues

for

benefits

the corpora-

because

of

the

By overlooking the pervasive "corporateness"

claims

litigation

sues,

and

ultimately,
the

confused

of

essential
and

the

action,

nature

complicated

of

the

this

its

lower

type of

procedures

The lower court erred in allowing the action

to proceed as a class action.
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B.

It Constituted Prejudicial Error To Allow this Action
to Proceed as a Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action.
It

has

resulted

in

very real prejudice

to the

Defendants herein to allow the Plaintiffs to proceed as a
Rule 23 class action as various shareholders have elected
to

"opt out" of the litigation.

ification of

this

cause as

was a superfluous,

legal

makes

the

little

whether

and

outset,

practical

it

procedural

technicalities.

should be clear

difference

to

the

that it

Defendants

the Plaintiffs elect to proceed herein as a Rule

23 (b) ( 1)

class

derivative

action

inconsiderable

or

as

Indeed,

suit.

bemused by Plaintiffs'
not

class action

But the Defendants' objections go far

metaphysics

At

a Rule 23(b)(3)

erroneous and obfuscating complication

of the proceedings.
beyond

At the very best, cert-

a Rule

23.1

Defendants

shareholders

were

somewhat

apparent willingness to assume the

expenses

and delays

attendant

upon

a

full blown class action,

at least in the first instance.

See:

&

94

Eisen vs. Carlisle

S.Ct

2140,

2153,

40

Jacguelin,

L.

Ed

2d

417 U.S.

732

(1974)

156,

179,

(Plaintiffs

must bear the initial costs of notice under Rule 23(c)(2)
"as part of the ordinary burden of financing
This

suit.")

ostensible

eagerness

to

(their) own

undertake

the

arduous and costly process of providing "the best notice
practicable
remarkable
largely,

under
in

view

the

circumstances"

of

if not entirely,

the

fact

that

unnecessary.

is

particularly

it may

well

be

Nevertheless, the
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lower

court has

allowed Plaintiff to proceed under Rule

23(b)(3) rather than under Rule 23(b)(l).
Plaintiffs

indisputably

That is to say,

have attempted to accord all

members of their putative class not only notice of this
action but also an opportunity to

"opt out" of the pre-

elusive effect of any judgment rendered herein;

it is

at this latter point that the Defendants balk.
If this action can be characterized as a class
action at all,

it must be classified as a Rule 23(b) (1)

action or, in the venerable vernacular of the former Rule,
a "true" class action.

See:

Note, "Developments in the

Law--Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts," 71
Harv. L.

Rev.

874 at 956

(1958).

As such,

any judgment

rendered in this action necessarily should be binding on
all

class

members,

i.e.,

23(c)(3) clearly mandates

on

all

such~

shareholders.

Rule

judicata in connection

with a Rule 23(b)(l) action, and states:
(3) The judgment in an action
maintained as a class action under
subdivision (b)(l) or (8)(2) (sic),
whether or not favorable to the
class, shall include and describe
those whom the court finds to be
members of the class. The judgment
in an action maintained as a class
action under subdivision (b)(3),
whether or not favorable to the
class, shall include and specify
or describe those to whom the
notice provided in subdivision
(c)(2) was directed, and who have
not requested exclusion, and whom
the court finds to be members of
the class.
Once again, Plaintiffs' Complaint is confusingly
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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indefinite on this subject.
Complaint ( R-3)

Whereas paragraph 7 3 of the

is devoted largely to a verbatim incanta-

tion of Rule 23(b)(l), which,
least arguably appropriate,

although general, is at

paragraph 8 4 seems to evoke,

3 Paragraph 7 of the Complaint states:
"That plaintiff alleges that this
action should be maintained as a
class action in that:
(1) the
prosecution of separate actions
by individual members of the class
would create a risk of: (a) inconsistent or varying adjudiciation
(sic) with respect to individual
members of the class which would
establish incompatible standards
of conduct for the party opposing
the class, (b) adjudications with
respect to individual members of
the class which would as a practical
matter be dispositive of interests
of other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially
impair or impede their ability to
protect their interest; ( 2) the
defendants have acted or refused
to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief
or corresponding declaratory relief
with respect to the class as a whole;
and
3) The questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions
effecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior
to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of
the controversy between the parties."
4

Paragraph 8 of the Complaint states:
"That the class is so numberous
(sic) that joinder of all members
is impracticable in that there are
questions of law or fact common
to the class that the claims or
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if not recite, the language of Rule 23(b)(3).
The

practical

consequences

of

the

proper

classification of this action are quite considerable.
Very simply, the problem is that in a Rule 23(b) (3) class
action, members of the class who "opt out" under Rule
23(c)(3) are simply not bound by any judgment entered
therein.

That is to say, such "opt-outs" can subsequently

bring suit on the self-same claims against the erstwhile
class defendants,
of

this

and under the particular circumstances

case such

repetitive actions

are

not merely

vexatious and exorbitant, but also egregiously unfair.

So

while certification of a Rule 23(b)(l) class action under
the present circumstances may be a relatively "harmless"
mistake,

failing to designate the class and,

therefore,

arguably allowing the prosecution of a Rule 23(b)(3) class
action

results

in an execrable

burden of

risk

being

imposed upon the Defendants.
The difference in this distinction is easily
demonstrated.
any,

both

In

this case,

obviously

corporation.

and

the

right of

admittedly

recovery,

"belongs"

to

if

the

While the shareholders may have standing to

sue in equity, still they must sue derivatively for and on

defenses of the representative
parties are typical to the claims
or defenses of the class and that
the named party plaintiffs as
representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests
of the class.
- provided
18 - by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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behalf of the corporation.

(See: Sect. IIA,

supra,)

Now, should each shareholder be permitted to "opt out" of
this

action and

ipso facto

action on these claims,
the

be allowed to bring his own

the corporation and through it,

shareholders--perhaps

even including

accorded

a

"second

the present

Plaintiffs--will

be

bite"

at the

proverbial apple.

This would not result in many different

suits, but rather in the same suit many different times.
Therein lies the essential difference upon which the
Defendants so vociferously insist.

The real-party-in

interest in this law suit, as in any shareholders derivative action,

is

vs. Juno Oil Co.,

the corporation.
265 P.2d 1,

See

at 11

~·

.9.·:

Beyerbach

(Cal., 1954).

When

the adjudication necessarily determines corporate claims,
it is simply nonsensical to speak of shareholders "opting
out" of

the action in any meaningful way.

The logical

upshot of the lower court's ruling on this issue is not
merely the preservation of individual claims--the paradigm
of the Rule 23(b) (3) class action provisions,--but rather
the repetitive presentation of the same corporate claims.

c.

The Established Procedures for a Shareholders Derivative Suit Under Rule 23.1 are fully Adequate for the
Prompt and Just Adjudication of the Issues Presented
in this Action.
The 1972 amendments to the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, which substantially parallel the 1966 revision
of the Federal Rules in this regard, established Rule 23.1
as

a separate,

self-contained rule on the subject of
- 19 -
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"derivative
observed

actions

that

importantly,

by

Rule

not

shareholders."

23.1

all

of

incorporates
the

adequacy
and

of

the

representation

settlements.

of

but,

be

most

contained within

In particular, Rule

the

shareholder-plaintiff

supervision

of

compromise

These two provisions are highly similar to,

and

equally

parent

by

judicial

if not duplicative of,

But

should

its own explicit provisions concerning the

necessity

23(a)(4)

some

procedures

Rule 23, dealing with class actions.
23.1 contains

It

Rule
as

23(e)

the

with

significant

"omissions"

in

requirements found

Rule

in

respect
this

23.1.

to

class

context
Foremost

in Rule
actions.

are

the

among

ap-

these

ostensible omissions is the studied avoidance in Rule 23.1
of anything like the rather elaborate notice provisions of
Rule

23.

Indeed,

Rule

23.1

appears

to

affirmatively

require notice to all shareholders only in connection with
a

settlement

or

dismissal

of

the

derivative

action

and

then only in the Court's sound discretion.
Aside
bereft

of

any

from

cross

its

status

references

or

as

a separate

other

apparent

rule,
inter-

relationship to Rule 23 proper, this pattern of selective
but

limited

adoption

of

class

action procedures

in Rule

23.1 argues strongly for a clear distinction between class
actions

in general,

whether commenced by shareholders or

others,

and the generic device of equitable jurisprudence

known as the shareholder's derivative suit.

Moreover,

it

is rather difficult to comprehend the need for a separate
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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rule on shareholder's derivative suits if,
actions are

all

class

actions,

seems

to

presumed

but

in fact,

such

indistinguishable from shareholder's

as Plaintiffs curiously bipolar Complaint

suggest.
that

On the contrary,

this Court was

it can hardly be

needlessly

redundant

in

adding Rule 23.1 to Rule 23 proper.
Since the present action is at bottom merely a
shareholder's derivative suit, Defendants submit that the
provisions of Rule 23.1 should properly govern its procedures. Defendants suggest that the procedures established
by Rule 23.1,
action,

are

workable

more appropriate,

than

Rule 23.

being designed for precisely

the

related,

Indeed,

this type of

expeditious,

and otherwise

but irrelevant, procedures of

little more than confusion,

expense

and delay are to be gained by stretching the allegations
of Plaintiffs' Complaint into a class action.

Conversely,

little or nothing of substance is to be lost by treating
this action as precisely what it appears to be; a shareThe following brief comparison

holders derivative suit.

and functional analysis of the respective rival procedures
in the present context may serve to illustrate Defendants'
pragmatic point.
Ordinarily a Court, when confronted with a Rule
23(c)

motion

for

certification

as

a

class

action,

must

determine (1) whether the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have
been

satisfied and,

within

one

of

the

if

so,

(2)

whether the action falls

categories established

in Rule 23(b) •
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See:

7A, Wright

§1785

(1972).

&

Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure,

The criteria of Rule 23(a)

simply do not

apply to a shareholder's derivative suit with any cogency
whatsoever.

In

a

derivative

difference whether

action

it

makes

little

the shareholders are so numerous that

their joinder in one action would be "impracticable."

The

joinder of all shareholders is simply not necessary in a
derivative suit.

Rule 23.1 explicitly acknowledges

that

such an action can be brought by any "one or more" shareholders.
limits
those

Can

the

it

be

seriously

availability

shareholders

in

of

a

argued

that Rule

derivative

corporations

large

23(a) (1)

action

to

only

enough

to make

the joinder of all shareholders impracticable?
Similarly,

it

seems quite

beside

the

point

in

the context of a shareholders derivative suit to inquire
whether the plaintiff's claims are "typical" of those held
by the remaining shareholders.
the shareholders
How,

then,

can

are not

a court

determination

at

The

issue

individual claims of
in a

derivative suit.

in such a case make a meaningful

that the plaintiff's claims are somehow

sufficiently

"typical" of the claims of

shareholders,

when,

dividual
claims

in

shareholder
common

to

point

claims

all

and

of
at

fact,
all,

peculiar

the remaining

there
but

to

are

only
none?

no

in-

corporate
No

less

Pickwickian is the inquiry as to whether questions of law
or

fact

are

"common"

Most assuredly,

to the shareholders in such a case.

it cannot be the intention of the Rules to
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require a court to apply such utterly incongruous and
somewhat vacuous

standards

to determine whether a share-

holders derivative action is to be maintained.
By

contrast,

Rule

23.1

establishes

procedures

reasonably responsive to the singular demands of a shareholders derivative action.
any

plaintiff

requires a

to

To determine the standing of

maintain

such

showing that he was

relevant period.

an

action,

Rule

23.1

a shareholder during the

Moreover, Rule 23.1 directs the court's

attention specifically to the adequacy of the plaintiff's
representation of the shareholder's interests "in enforcing
members.
has

the

right of the corporation" of which they are

Finally,

exhausted

corporation

the plaintiff must demonstrate that he

his

intracorporate

either

has

refused

recourse

or

and

that

the

is unable to commence

the action on its own.
By
mean

rigor,

indulging
perhaps

in

the

intellectual contortions of no
Rule

23 (a)

typicality,

common-

ality, and adequacy standards, although, in any event, not
the

numerosity

not saying,

requirement,

much

argumentative

can be

contortions

necessarily
presumably,

any

compensating gain

if

Yet such

involve

some

the intended

Defendants are at a loss

meaning of the Rules at issue.
see

implying,

the same thing as Rule 23 .1.

distortion of the plain and,

to

read as

to

redeem such

a

fiction,

save perhaps the "problem" of avoiding their participation
as

shareholders

in

any

corporate

recovery

realized upon
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the Complaint's
nonfeasance.

allegations

But

a

of

their

reasonably

own mal-,

direct

mis-,

solution

to

or

that

problem is well within the inherent equity jurisdiction of
the

court

sitting

That is to say,

in

any

shareholder's derivative

suit.

the Court may order a direct pro-rata

recovery

to

certain

corporate

recovery.

shareholders
See e.g.:

in

lieu

of

a

truly

Perlman vs. Feldmann,

219

F.2d 172 (2d Cir.) cert. den. 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
Of
ficant

course,

theoretical

generally,

Leech,

104 U.

L.

Pa.

there

are

certain not

problems with
"Transactions

Rev.

725,

such

in

809-825

insigni-

a device.

Corporate

(1956).

See

Control,"

The relative

desirability of such a structured recovery remains an open
question for

the lower court to resolve at an appropriate

juncture

this

in

litigation.

Rather,

the salient point

here consists in the observation that such
straightforward
deal with such
and
Rule

needless
23

responses
issues,

are

as

invocation of

class

action

to

available

to

relatively

the

court

to

an alternative to the strained
the unwieldy
accomplish

procedures

largely

the

of a
same

result.
Finally, it should be noted that proceeding with
this cause as a class action raises notorious, but as yet
unresolved, questions concerning notice to class members.
While Rule 23 (c) ( 2)

requires such notice at the outset in

connection with a Rule 23(b)(3) action, Eisen vs. Carlisle
&

Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 94

s.

Ct 2140, 40 L. Ed 2d 732
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(1974),

it is plausible that Rule 23(d)(2) may oblige the

Court to
(b)(2)

require

actions

similar

as

notice

well.

7A,

in Rule

Wright

&

23(b) (1)
Miller,

and 23
Federal

Practice and Procedure, §§1786, 1793 (1972).
The delicacy and difficulty of the due process
questions

underlying

the

proper

construction

pretation of these Rules cannot be gainsaid.
however,

observe that

representative,

and

inter-

Defendants,

in the class action context the

absentee

adjudication of

individually

cognizable claims adds immeasurably to the gravity of the
notice
seeking
have

and

due

process questions

class

raised

a

certification
panoply

in

at

issue therein.

By

this

case,

Plaintiffs

of due process

issues

which will

necessitate the attentive and persistent consideration of
the

lower

court

throughout

the pendancy of this action.

Although by no means entirely expiated, the notice issues
may prove to be a good deal less noisome to both counsel
and the lower court in the context of a shareholder's
derivative suit.
As

indicated, Rule 23.1 does not contain the

same sort of textual mandate for notice to absent parties
as

does

Rule

23

itself.

Aside from whatever comfort

such an exegesis of the respective rules may offer, it is
certainly arguable that these textual differences reflect
an
a

underlying distinction of some persuasiveness.
derivative

cognizable

action

legal

does

not

implicate

Since

individually

rights directly held by absentees, but,
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at

most,

affects

the

somewhat

more

attenuated

secondary

"rights" of shareholders to act as volunteers for
corporation,
shareholder

the
are

property

likely

to

interests
be

of

a

of

the

different

the

absentee
and

lesser

order than those of a typical class member in his personal
chose-in-action;

the

structure

of

"corporate

further conditions these rights as well.
the

ostensible

representative
celebre

of

the

against

recognized as
class

"right"

That is to say,

proceed

as

the

corporation

in

an

alleged

absolute

member's

to

malefactors

securities,

self-appointed
apparent

has

in the same sense

anti-trust,

most

pervasive

absentee shareholder
are

and

fundamental

been

typical

consumer

or

tort

Consequently,

interests

of

an

in the context of a derivative suit

largely co-terminous with

primarily,

cause

never

that a

claims have been understood to be "vested."
the

democracy"

they consist

those

in the

of

the

corporation;

interests of both

in the

responsible and vigorous prosecution of the corporate
claims against the

alleged corporate wrongdoers.

dants

judicial

submit

that

supervision

of

the

Defenadequacy

of representation under Rule 23.1 may suffice to protect
this

interest

with

much

greater

constitutional

efficacy

than in the case of a paradigmatic class action under Rule
23 itself.
Even

in

the

class

action milieu,

there

some not

inconsiderable authority to the effect

adequacy

of

the

representation provided

by

is

that the

the

named
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plaintiff,
enforceable

~

albeit perhaps not the sine
judgment,

is

nonetheless

a

non of an

material

to be weighed in the due process balance.

factor

Hence, to the

extent that the representation provided by the class
plaintiff is satisfactory, notice to individual class
members

of

counsel or,

their

rights

alternately,

to

intervene

through

to "opt out"

their

own

in a tacit demon-

stration of "no confidence" in the class representatives,
is somewhat less crucial from the constitutional per-

Ct.

2,

85 L.

U.S.

Grounds,
grounds

508 F. 2d 239,

1011
292 F.

441

32 at 42-43, 61

s.

Ed 3 (1940), Wetzel vs. Liberty Mutual

Insurance Co.,
421

u.s.

Hansberry vs. Lee, 311

spective.

F.

(1975),
Supp.
2d 704

256

(3d. Cir.) cert. den.

Northern Natural Gas Co. vs.

619,

636

(lOth.

(D.

Cir.

Kan.)

rev .

.£!)_ ~

1971), Comment,

"The

Importance of Being Adequate: Due Process Requirements in
Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23," 123 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1217, 1224-1231 (1975).
There is, of course, no consensus on this point
in connection with class actions as a generic type of
litigation.

See:

Eisen vs. Carlisle

&

Jacquelin,

391 F.

2d 555, 564-565 (2d. Cir., 1968) (notice is a due process
requirement in all class actions).

The Supreme Court in

Eisen premises its holding principally,

if not exclu-

sively, upon a textual construction and interpretation of
Rule 23(c)(2) itself, thereby avoiding a direct opinion on
the overriding due process issues raised therein.

So the
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constitutional
class

actions

variety.
deal

question
other

Here

more

than

adequacy

meaningful
Dam,

due process.

still

is

open

in

of

the

those

of

the

context of

Rule

23(b)(3)

representation may be

than

notice

as

the

"Class Action Notice,

a good

talisman

of

Who Needs It?"

1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1318, 1402-1416 (1976).
Defendants

submit

constitutional

sufficiency

is

in

strongest

Consequently,

of

connection

the

with

to those

found

for

the

representation"

derivative
it cannot

the absence of notice

comparable

argument

"adequate

notwithstanding Eisen,

concluded that
23.1

that

suits.

be glibly

requirement

in Rule

23

in Rule

itself

belies

any constitutional infirmity in a typical derivative suit
procedure,

particularly when

abse~tee

the

the underlying

interests of

plaintiffs are so radically different both in

nature and in extent in a derivative action as opposed to
a class action.
Defendants
allowing
Rule

class

23(c).

action
The

fully set forth
discussion,
of

all

above.

necessary

to

fit

this

result

plications.

Rather,
and

so

the

lower

certification

reasons

action mold,

pervasive

that

for

this

this

erred

cause

conclusion

that

the

adjustments,

if

derivative

in

of

court

in

under

have

been

In the light of the foregoing

Defendants submit

the

necessary

urge

more

these

cumulative effect
not

action

than merely

into

as

the

class

procedural

complications

intractible

machinations,

to work

are
a

at

com-

once so

subtle
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but

substantial change in the very character of the equitable
rights

and

thereby.

remedies

That

procedural

is

which Plaintiffs

to say,

seek

to enforce

the cumulative effect of these

innovations may contravene the substantive

limitations of

the deriviative action procedure alto-

gether.

Note,

See:

"Developments

in the Law--Class

Actions," 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1353-1372 (1976).
In

any

certification

case,

of

this

the

fact

action

remains

may

well

that

result

class
in

the

creation of a procedural albatross of unnecessary and
unmanageable
First,

this

It

not

is

cannot
which

a class
it

so.

Plaintiffs
of

procedures

efficacious

The

arguments

are

clear:

is simply and in realtity a derivative suit.

make

archtypical
the

proportions.

and

action.
The

essential

assert

a

Plaintiffs'

nature

of

the claims

derivative and,

in fact,

shareholders derivative suit.

Second,

of

Rule

are

characterization

23.1

expeditious

are

fully

management

adequate
of

this

for

the

action.

Third, it is not necessary to indulge in the subterfuge of
casting this action in the form of a class action merely
to obtain an equitable apportionment of any recovery which
may

be

matter

realized

herein.

Such

relief

is

available as

a

of course in the exercise of the court's inherent

equity powers.
confusion,
providing

not
any

Moreover, the costs in terms of procedural
to

mention

required

the

notice

expensive mechanics
to

the

of

putative class,

outweigh any benefits reasonably to be derived from such
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procedural
from

a

innovation.

review

of

the

Finally,

record,

elected to "opt out" of this

as

can

be

shareholders
litigation.

observed

have

in

fact

Defendants are

therefore exposed to the threat of separate future litigation based upon precisely the same claims contained

in

Plaintiffs' Complaint.
Defendants submit that the lower court erred in
granting

a

class

action

certification

in

this

case.

CONCLUSION
The lower court abused

its discretion in ap-

pointing a receiver for Major Oil Corporation without any
affirmative showing by the Plaintiffs of the need for such
an appointment. A complaint verified upon information and
belief will

not,

standing alone,

of a receiver.

support the appointment

The appointment of a receiver on this

basis seriously interferes with the Defendants' management
prerogatives and substantial property rights and deprives
the defendants of due process of law.

The lower court's

Order appointing a receiver should be reversed.
This
derivative
corporation

action

action.
and

circumstances,

no

more

Plaintiffs'

not
to

is

those

of

certify

the

than

claims

a

shareholders

are

those

individuals.
action

as

of

Under
a

the

these

class-action

and to allow members of the class to "opt-out" precludes
the res judicata effect of
Defendants

to

unwarranted

a

judgment and exposes the

and

litigation

upon

precisely the same claims found in the case at bar.

The

-

30 -

repeated
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lower court's Order certifying a class should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY

SUBMITTED

this

31st day

of July,

1978.

DAVID R. OLSJN,~
SUITTER, AXLAND & ARMSTRONG
Suite 2150, Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
ROBERT

WALTER

JENSEN,

Esq.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

copies

of

This

is to certify that two true and correct

the

foregoing Brief of Appellants were mailed

postage prepaid to Paul N. Cotro-Manes, Esq. at 430 Judge
Building,
Nielson,
Utah

Salt
Esq.

Lake

City,

Utah

84111

at 320 Kearns Building,

and Parker M.

Salt Lake City,

84101, this 31st day of July, 1978.
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APPENDIX A
Rule 23 .1.

Derivative Actions by Shareholders

In a derivative action brought by one or more
shareholders or members to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated assoc-1at16n, the corporation
or associatron hav1ng fa1led to enforce a right which may
properly be asserted by it, the complainant (sic) shall be
verified and shall allege {1) that the plaintiff was a
shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of
which he complains or that his share or membership thereafter devolved on him by operation of law, and (2) that
the action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction
on a court of the State of Utah which it would not otherwise have.
The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to
obtain the action he desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders
or members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain the
action or for not making the effort.
The derivative
action may not be maintained if it appears that the
plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association.
The action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court, and notice of the
proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or members in such manner as the court directs.
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APPENDIX B
Rule 23.

Class Actions

(a)
Prerequisites to a Class Action.
One or
more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, ( 2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class, ( 3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.
COMMITTEE NOTE:
Rule 23(a) was amended by the Supreme
Court on June 23, 1971, effective January 1, 1972.
The
amendment rewrote the provisions.
For the rule prior
to amendment, see the parent volume.
(b)
Class Actions Maintainable.
An action may
be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of
subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1)
the prosecution of separate actions by
or against individual members of the class would
create a risk of
(A)
inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or
{B)
adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive
of the interests of the other members not
parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests; or
(2)
the party opposing the class has
acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief with respect to the class as
a whole; or
( 3)
the court finds that the questions of
law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting_ on~y
individual members, and that a class act1on lS
superior to other available methods for the fair
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and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in
individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members
of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the d ifficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
COM~IITTEE
NOTE:
Rule 23 (b) was amended by the Supreme
The
Court on June 23, 1971, effective January 1, 1972.
amendment rewrote the provisions.

(c)
Determination by Order Whether Class
Action
to be Maintained; Notice; Judgment; Actions
conducted Partially as Class Actions.

(1)
As soon as practicable after the
commencement of an action brought as a class
action, the court shall determine by order
whether it is to be maintained.
An order under
this subdivision may be conditional, and may be
altered or amended before the decision on the
mer1ts.
(2)
In any class action maintained under
subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to
the members of the class the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort.
The
notice shall advise each member that (A) the
court will exclude him from the class if he so
requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment,
whether favorable or not, will include all
members who do not request exclusion; and (C)
any member who does not request exclusion may,
if he desires, enter an appearance through his
counsel.
(3)
The judgment in an action maintained
as a class action under subdivision (b) (1) or
(8)(2), (sic) whether or not favorable to the
class, shall include and describe those whom the
court finds to be members of the class.
The
judgment in an action maintained as a class
action under subdivis1on (b) (3), whether or not
favorable to the class, shall include and
specify or describe those to whom the notice
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provided in subdivision (c) (2) was directed, and
who have not requested exclusion, and whom the
court finds to be members of the class.
(4)
When appropriate (A) an action may be
brought or maintained as a class action with
respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may
be divided into subclasses and each subclass
treated as a class, and the provisions of this
rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
COMMITTEE NOTE:
Rule 23(c) was amended by the Supreme
Court on June 23, 1971, effective January 1, 1972.
The
amendment rewrote the provisions.
(d)
Orders in Conduct of Actions.
In the
conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court
may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of
proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue
repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence
or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the
members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of
the action, that notice be given in such manner as the
court may direct to some or all of the members of any step
in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment,
or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they
consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come
into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the
pleading be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as
to representation of absent persons, and that the action
proceed accordingly; ( 5) dealing with similar procedural
matters.
The orders may be combined with an order under
Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable
from time to time.
COMMITTEE NOTE:
Rule 23 (d) was adopted by the Supreme
Court on June 23, 1971, effective January 1, 1972.
(e)
Dismissal or compromise.
A class action
shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval
of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or
compromise shall be given to all members of the class in
such manner as the court directs.
COMMITTEE NOTE:
Rule 23(e) was adopted by the Supreme
Court on June 23, 1971, effective January 1, 1972.
For
the prior rule relating to dismissal or compromise of
class action, see Rule 23(c) in the parent volume.
-
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